their potential political power? Are the Japanese strong enough to endure the long years of economic hardship that lie ahead without seeking refuge in some shallow panacea? And most important of all, can the Japanese masses, so accustomed to believing what they are told, learn in time the healthy skepticism and independence of judgment upon which freedom depends?
Despite these many uncertainties, there is, however, one very good reason for optimism—the adaptability of the Japanese. They are pragmatists, and in the past have shown themselves capable of abandoning old customs and habits of thought when convinced that there was something better. The leaders of the early Meiji period, when they realized that their feudal political and military system was inferior to the nation states and citizen armies of the West, made a startling about-face and did away with feudalism. It now appears that the Japanese are making another abrupt about-face. As in Meiji days, many will undoubtedly be incapable of changing their ways of life and thought, but even among Japanese the one irrefutable argument against the old order will be that militarism and ultra-nationalism led Japan into the worst national disaster she has ever suffered.
No one can yet tell what the new age in Japan will mean in the long run—democracy or authoritarianism; liberalism, fascism, or communism; international cooperation or blind nationalism. The outcome is of concern to the whole world, for the success or failure of the attempt to create a peaceful and democratic Japan inevitably will influence the cause of peace and democracy in other parts of the world. What we do in Japan,