5th Field Artillery troops at the 1st Division parade, September 1919
Changes in command and control touched all divisional echelons. The board recommended headquarters detachments for artillery and infantry brigades along with larger staffs. Because the ammunition train served primarily with the artillery brigade, it proposed making the train an organic element of that unit but serving both artillery and infantry troops. Similarly, the board members believed that the engineer train should be a part of the engineer regiment. Following the principle of placing resources under the control of those who used them, the board wanted to drop the machine gun battalion from the infantry brigade and place a machine gun company in each infantry battalion. The board members believed that only when the infantry commander had his own machine gun company could he learn to handle it properly. For training in mass machine gun fire, the board advised that the companies assemble occasionally under a brigade machine gun officer. It also advocated the retention of a divisional machine gun officer and a divisional machine gun battalion to provide a reserve for barrage or mass fire.
The board regarded the rear area division train headquarters and the accompanying military police as unnecessary. When needed, the division commander could appoint an officer to command the rear elements. The military police could become a separate company. The war had disclosed complex communication problems, particularly in the use of radios, but no uniform signal organization existed. To overcome that defect, the board advised that a closer examination of divisional signal needs be conducted with consideration given to dividing them along functional lines.
Turning to firepower, the Superior Board recommended the elimination of ineffective weapons and the addition or retention of effective ones. Based on wartime experience, the 6-inch mortar battery in the field artillery brigade was
