In late 1942 the War Department selected the 7th Motorized Division to be part of the assault forces to be used to drive the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands. In spite of growing doubts by Army Ground Forces about the usefulness of fully motorized divisions, the division was chosen because of its high state of readiness. Furthermore, it was located near Fort Ord, California, an amphibious training site, and could conveniently undergo the training required for the operation. On 1 January 1943 the 7th Motorized Division reverted to a standard infantry division.[1]
Besides the shortage of trained manpower, the nation also faced a severe shortage of ships large enough to transport divisions to the combat theaters. For this and other military and political reasons, plans for an early invasion of Europe across the English Channel were postponed. Also, the expansion and deployment of Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces units placed heavy demands on available shipping, while the success of German submarines off the Eastern Seaboard of the United States made that shortage of tonnage even more acute. Finally, the demands of the hard-pressed Pacific theaters put an unprecedented strain on shipping facilities. Therefore, from October 1942 to March 1943 no division departed the United States, and from March to November 1943 only eleven went overseas.[2]
In October 1942, acting to alleviate the growing shipping problem, Marshall directed Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces to eliminate unnecessary vehicles and excess noncombatants. He sought a 15 percent reduction in personnel and a 20 percent reduction in vehicles. In particular, he deemed the requirements for divisional transportation in the tables of organization and equipment to be extravagant because they represented what division commanders asked for rather than what they actually needed.[3]
To accomplish these objectives, McNair established the Army Ground Forces Reduction Board to review all units under his control. Two principles, streamlining and pooling, guided the work. The former limited a unit to what it needed on a daily basis, while the latter gathered at corps[4] or army levels resources that were believed to be only occasionally required. Pooling was derived from the assumption that a division would be usually assigned to a corps or an army.[5]
After the Reduction Board concluded its work on the infantry division in March 1943, 2,102 officers and enlisted men and 509 vehicles were stripped from the divisional tables of organization. The scalpel slashed most divisional elements. The cuts eliminated 363 men and 56 vehicles from the infantry regiment, with the cannon company deleted entirely. The regiment retained six 105mm. towed howitzers, which required less shipping space than 75-mm. self-propelled guns, used less gasoline, and did less damage to light bridging. These were placed in the regimental headquarters company. The number of automatic rifles was pruned from 189 to 81, but the introduction of the new 2.36-inch rocket launchers (bazookas) provided powerful antitank and antipillbox resources that required no designated operator in the regiment. Reductions in medical, commu-
- ↑ Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 277; Ltr, TAG to CGs AGF and II Armored Corps, 1 Jan 42, sub: Redesignation and Reorganization of the 7th Motorized Division, AG 320.2 (12–31–42) OB-I-GN-M (Order of Battle, Intelligence, AGF), 7th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
- ↑ Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, p. 286; Palmer et al., Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 489–93.
- ↑ Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 286–87.
- ↑ On 19 August 1942 army corps were officially redesignated as corps.
- ↑ Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 288–89, 291.
