Deployment and More Organizational Changes
Although the Army began deploying divisions shortly after the nation entered the war, the number of trained and partially trained divisions still located within the United States mounted in 1943 because of port and shipping problems. Unlike World War I, no troops were to be sent to foreign stations unless the War Department could guarantee their supply. In August 1943 sixty divisions were at various stages of readiness in the United States.[1]
Toward the end of 1943 the deployment picture brightened. With the nation's massive ship-building program and the retreat of German submarines from the western Atlantic, the War Department was able to accelerate the deployment of divisions. Most went to Europe to take part in the cross-Channel attack and the drive to strike at the German heartland. Eventually 68 divisions—47 infantry, 16 armored, 4 airborne, and 1 mountain—fought in Europe and 21 divisions—1 airborne, 1 cavalry (organized as infantry), and 19 infantry—in the Pacific area. (Tables 15 and 16 give the date that each division moved to the port of embarkation.) No division remained in the continental United States after February 1945.[2]
Although most infantry and armored divisions had been reorganized prior to seeing combat because of the delay in moving them overseas, the Army reorganized its airborne divisions to meet specific combat needs. The first modification, involving only the 82d, took place during the preparation for the Sicilian campaign. Because of a shortage of shipping space for gliders, a crated glider being one of the largest pieces of equipment sent overseas, a parachute infantry regiment replaced one of the glider regiments, and a second parachute field artillery battalion was added. The change was in keeping with the original plan for the division, which envisioned a task force organization.[3]
After the Sicily campaign, General Ridgway, the commander of the "All American" 82d, organized a small pathfinder team to help divisional elements reach their targets. The team's mission was to jump into the assault area and guide the remainder of the division to the drop zone. After the team proved successful in Italy, other airborne divisions organized similar units.[4]
Combat operations soon demonstrated that the airborne division lacked sufficient manpower and equipment for sustained operations. In Sicily and Italy resources were not available to relieve or replace the division with either an infantry or armored division as quickly as planners had envisioned. In December 1943 Ridgway recommended changes in the airborne division to correct major deficiencies. Because it served primarily as infantry, he wanted more transportation resources; additional medical, engineer, and quartermaster support; and greater infantry and artillery firepower. Planners in Washington opposed the changes because they thought the additional equipment and personnel would prevent the division from serving as a light, mobile force, stripped to the bare essentials and easily air transportable.[5]
- ↑ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," p. 374.
- ↑ Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 246–47; Palmer et al., Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 489–92.
- ↑ Ltr, TAG to CGs, Second Army and Airborne Command, 4 Feb 43, sub: Changes in Assignment of Units to the 82d Airborne Division and Airborne Command, AG 320.2 (2–3–43) OB-I-GN-M, 82d Abn Div file, DAMH-HSO; James E. Mrazek, The Glider War (London: Robert Hale and Company, 1975), p. 108.
- ↑ James M. Gavin, On to Berlin, pp. 49–50.
- ↑ Memo, AGF for CofS, 17 Dec 43, sub: Change in T/O, Airborne Division, 320.3/75 (S)-GNGCT, and Memo, G–3 for ACofS, 17 Dec 43, same subject, WDGCT 320.2, both Correspondence, Matthew Ridgway in Marshall Papers.
