blocks. The strength of the division stood at approximately 13,500 officers and enlisted men, a cut of nearly 4,000 from the 1953 division.[1]
The armored division (Chart 27) retained its task force structure. It consisted of headquarters, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three medium and three heavy tank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. The headquarters battalion was the same as in the infantry division except for the reconnaissance unit, which was a separate battalion. The artillery was also similar to that in the infantry division, but the 105-mm. howitzers were self-propelled rather than towed. A maintenance battalion and a supply and transport battalion were assigned to the support command, but the division had no separate medical or personnel service units, those functions being integrated into the support battalion. The strength of the division was approximately 12,000 officers and enlisted men, a drop of almost 2,700 soldiers.[2]
Within both divisions the designers of the Atomic Field Army–1 introduced some significant changes. All aircraft were gathered into an aviation company in the headquarters battalion. The signal battalion, rather than maintaining communications along various axes, provided a grid system that encompassed the entire division area. New FM (frequency modulation) radios permitted that change. Antiaircraft guns were placed in the field artillery battalions, and the military police functions were split between the personnel service and the supply and transport units in the support commands. Separate antiaircraft artillery battalions and military police companies disappeared from both divisions. Neither division fielded nuclear weapons, which were instead located at the field army level.[3]
In February 1955 the 3d Infantry Division in Exercise Follow Me and the 1st Armored Division in Exercise Blue Bolt tried out these new organizations. The results of the infantry division test showed that independent infantry battalions and the combat commands added flexibility and that the support command provided an acceptable base from which to improve logistical functions. Generally, however, the division lacked the capability to wage sustained combat operations. It needed more on-the-ground strength to execute normal battlefield missions during an atomic war and larger reconnaissance forces to cover the extended frontages and depths envisaged for the nuclear battlefield. Additional antitank and artillery weapons were also required. Staffs at division, combat command, and battalion levels were too small to be fully effective. Blue Bolt neither proved nor disproved that the 1st Armored Division possessed less vulnerability to atomic attacks. But the use of the same command posts for combat command headquarters and tank battalions increased the division's vulnerability to air attacks, as did the omission of the antiaircraft artillery battalion.[4]
Following the exercises Army Field Forces revised the two organizations, and the 3d Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division again tested them, this time in Operation Sagebrush, a joint Army and Air Force exercise. Both divisions retained combat commands, but their staffs were increased to allow them to conduct operations from separate command posts. The infantry division had two tank
- ↑ Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-1, 13 Sep 54; TOE 7 ATFA, Infantry Division, 30 Sep 1954.
- ↑ Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-1, 13 Sep 54; TOE 17 ATFA, Armored Division, 30 Sep 1954.
- ↑ Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-1, 13 Sep 54.
- ↑ Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Infantry Division, ATTNG-D&R (Office of the CofS, G–3–Research and Development, 322/50 (Div) (25 Apr 56), and Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 23 May 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Armored Division, ATTNG-D&R 322/16 (Diy) (23 May 56), both Division General file, DAMH-HSO; Midgley, Deadly Illusions, p.49.
