of PENTANA. Ridgway wanted the study to outline broad doctrinal and organizational concepts applicable to sustained ground combat on the Eurasian land mass during the period 1960–70. While the study was to make use of the maximum technological developments, including nuclear weapons of all types, Ridgway also desired that the Army retain a capability for conventional warfare.[1] An image should appear at this position in the text.101st Airborne Division simulates an atomic bomb blast. For Campbell, Kentucky, 1957.
Completed in December 1955, the Army War College study called for a completely air transportable 8,600-man division to replace infantry, airborne, and armored divisions. The new division was to be built around five small, self-sufficient "battle groups" that would include their own artillery. The battle groups were to meet the tactical requirements for dispersion of forces, operations in depth, and increased flexibility and mobility on the atomic battlefield. Organic division artillery, although meager, included the Honest John, a surface-to-surface rocket with a nuclear warhead. The division had minimal logistical and administrative support and lacked tanks, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units (Chart 28).[2]
Not surprisingly, many Army leaders found the PENTANA division unacceptable. When General John E. Dahlquist, commander of the Continental Army Command, forwarded the study to Washington, he noted that the reaction of the arms and services to the division was directly related to the impact of the proposal on their strengths and missions. Those who perceived an increase in responsibility endorsed the idea, those who saw no change acquiesced, and those who discerned a diminution of strengths and responsibilities violently opposed it. The Armor School objected to the lack of divisional tanks, the Artillery School desired more conventional artillery, and the Command and General Staff College questioned the division's staying power. The most damning comment came from Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., who considered the concept "completely unacceptable intellectually and scientifically."[3]
Nevertheless, Chief of Staff Taylor approved the PENTANA study on 1 June 1956 as a goal for future research and development of new weapons, equipment, and organizations. It was not an entirely new idea for him. As the commander of the Eighth Army he had experimented with a division having five subordinate elements in the Korean Army. In the meantime, the Army was to fill the gap
- ↑ Ltr, G–3 to CG, CONARC, 17 Nov 54, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period FY 1960–1970, RG 319, NARA; Midgley, Deadly Illusions, pp. 58–59.
- ↑ Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 28 Oct 55, sub: PENTANA Army (U), ATSWD (Combat Developments)-G–322/4 (Army) (28 Oct 55), 322/4 (Army), RG 319, NARA.
- ↑ Ltr, John E. Dahlquist to Maxwell D. Taylor, 12 Dec 55, 322/19/Army 6–10 Aug 56, RG 319, NARA.
