group in the division was to be held in reserve, he proposed deleting its direct support artillery battery. Other recommendations included eliminating the support group and reorganizing the logistical resources, except for maintenance organized along functional lines, in a pre-Atomic Field Army configuration. A 10 percent increase in divisional strength was suggested, as well as an enlarged garrison complement wherever a pentomic division was stationed. Hickey wished to move the administration company to the rear because its functions did not require the unit's presence in the forward area; he thought the infantry platoon should be eliminated from the reconnaissance troop because it lacked the mobility of the troop's other elements; and he wanted a military intelligence detachment added to the division's headquarters battalion to help with order of battle, photographic interpretation, and other G–2 duties. Finally, he advocated an increase in the grades of the commanders of the rifle companies, mortar batteries, and howitzer batteries to make their rank commensurate with the responsibilities associated with independent actions required on the "pentomic battlefield."[1]
The test findings and Hickey's recommendations worked their way through the Continental Army Command. Dahlquist agreed with most of Hickey's proposals except for the artillery and support group. He believed that 105-mm. howitzers should be retained as direct support weapons because they could be airlifted in two helicopter loads or towed by 3/4-ton trucks. Rather than decreasing the number of artillery batteries, he wanted the division to retain five, each with six pieces. He opposed changes in the support group because its structure had not been fully tested, and he felt that Hickey's recommendation to eliminate it was premature.[2]
The Army Staff agreed with Dahlquist's views regarding the number of artillery batteries but not on increasing the number of pieces in each battery. No change in the support group won approval, and the staff opposed the elimination of the infantry platoon from the reconnaissance troop, the addition of the military intelligence detachment, and alterations in the rank of company and battery commanders. The Continental Army Command published tables of organization for the pentomic airborne division reflecting the views of the Army Staff in June 1958 without a change in unit's overall strength. Both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions adopted them by December.[3]
Shortly after the 101st Airborne Division began testing ROTAD, Taylor directed the Continental Army Command to develop a new infantry division along similar pentagonal lines. It was to have five battle groups (a headquarters and service company, one mortar battery, and four infantry companies each); conventional and nuclear artillery; tank, signal, and engineer battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with ground and air capabilities; and trains. The trains, who commander was responsible for the activities of the service troops in the rear area, were to include a transportation battalion, an aviation company, and an administration company. The transportation battalion was to have sufficient armored personnel carriers to move an entire battle group at one time, and the aviation company was to be placed in the trains for better supervision of its maintenance. Taylor wanted to
- ↑ Ibid. p. 6–12.
- ↑ Ibid.
- ↑ Ibid., p. 13; CONARC, "Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 57–30 Jun 58," vol. 3, Organization and Equipment Division, pp. 1–4, DAMH-HSR; TOE 57D, Airborne Division, 1958; Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Nov 58, sub: Reorganization of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, AGAO-O (M) 322 (20 Oct 58) DCSPER, 10st Abn Div file, DAMH-HSO; "The Army's Month," Army 8 (Apr 1958); 20.
