Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/301

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THE SEARCH FOR ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS
279

Reorganization of the Divisions

After the Continental Army Command completed the tables of organization for infantry and armored divisions, Taylor met with Army school commandants on 28 February 1957 to sell them on the pentomic reorganization of the Army. He noted that the doctrine of massive retaliation ruled out nuclear war, but that the chance existed that war might stem from unchecked local aggression or error. The Army had to be prepared to prevent or stop a small war as well as conduct a nuclear conflict. He believed that the new divisions, although controversial, could meet both challenges.[1]

More important was what Taylor did not say about the pentomic divisions and why the Army was adopting them. The Army's budget called for unglamorous weapons and equipment such as rifles, machine guns, and trucks, which had little appeal for Congress or the nation. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson earlier had returned the Army's budget to Taylor, directing him to substitute "newfangled" equipment that Congress would support.

The Army's literature soon reported on such ideas as "convertiplanes," which combined the advantages of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft; one-man "flying platforms"; and the adoption of pentomic divisions, which fielded nuclear weapons. Later Taylor wrote, "nuclear weapons were the going thing and, by including some in the division armament, the Army staked out its claim to a share of the nuclear arsenal."[2]

When reorganizing Regular Army infantry and armored divisions in 1957 under the pentomic structure, several major changes were made in the force to accommodate a cut of 100,000 men and changing world conditions. In the Far East, the United States agreed to withdraw all ground combat troops from Japan. Subsequently the 1st Cavalry Division moved to Korea, where it replaced the 24th Infantry Division. While the 7th Infantry Division remained in Korea, the 24th was eventually reorganized in Germany to replace the 11th Airborne Division. Also in Germany, the 3d Infantry Division replaced the 10th Infantry Division, which was returned to Fort Benning as part of Gyroscope. With these changes U.S. Army, Europe, still fielded five divisions, the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions and the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions. The European command also retained an airborne capability by reorganizing two battle groups in the 24th Infantry Division as airborne units. At Fort Benning, Georgia, the 2d Infantry Division, which earlier had been reduced to zero strength, replaced the 10th Infantry Division, which was inactivated. The 5th Infantry Division was also inactivated at Fort Ord; the 1st Armored Division, less its Combat Command A, was reduced to zero strength; and the 25th Infantry Division was cut one battle group. When the game of musical chairs with divisions was over, the Regular Army consisted of fifteen divisions. In most cases only the division names and flags moved, not the personnel and equipment. These changes in the divisional designations reflected the desire of Army leaders to keep divisions with outstand-

  1. Taylor's address, 28 Feb 57.
  2. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p, 171; Glenn Hawkins, "United States Force Structure and Force Design Initiatives, 1939–1989." Ms, pp. 35–36, DAMH-RAD; "Infantry of Tomorrow," Army, 6 (Sep 1955): 47–48; "Let's All Fly on Platforms," Army 6 (Dec 1955): 25.