training divisions in 1959, and the adjutant general officially redesignated them as "divisions (training)."[1]
One of the objectives of the pentomic reorganization was to enable the units to absorb new equipment. The M14 rifle, a 7.62-caliber rifle that could fire in semiautomatic or automatic modes, replaced the vintage M1 rifle, the carbine, the submachine gun, and the Browning automatic rifle; the 7.62-caliber M60 machine gun replaced the heavy water-cooled and light air-cooled Browning .30-caliber machine guns. These new weapons simplified production; reduced spare parts, maintenance, and training time; and used standard NATO cartridges, permitting greater compatibility with Western European weapons. The diesel-powered M60 tank, armed with a 105-mm. gun, and the low silhouette, air-transportable M113 armored personnel carrier also entered the Army's inventory. Work began on new antiaircraft weapons, recoilless rifles, and 4.2-inch mortars, but most did not become available for several more years.[2]
When the Army completed the pentomic reorganization in 1960, it had 51 combat divisions in its three components (14 in the Regular Army, 10 in the Army Reserve, and 27 in the National Guard), 5 infantry brigades (2 in the Regular Army and 3 in the Guard), and 1 Regular Army armored combat command. Although divisions were organized for nuclear warfare, only a few were actually ready for combat. Some Regular Army divisions continued to conduct their own basic training courses to reduce costs and personnel, and Korean nationals served in the divisions in Korea. Guard units ranged between 55 and 71 percent of their authorized strengths, while Army Reserve organizations varied from 45 to 80 percent.[3]
In sum, as the Eisenhower administration reduced the Army's budget from $16 billion to $9.3 billion between 1953 and 1960, the total force dropped to the lowest number of divisions since the beginning of the Korean War. On the surface, changing concepts of warfare during this period led the Army to adopt pentomic divisions, structures that fell outside traditional organizational practices. But whatever the concerns of Army leaders for operating on a nuclear battlefield, Taylor, the primary force behind the new divisions, clearly was using the pentomic concepts to get increases in the military budget from political leaders who were less interested in supporting more conventional military systems. Nevertheless, the fertile ideas of this period resulted in new organizational concepts and new equipment and weapon systems, all of which were to see further development in the next two decades.
- ↑ TOE 29–7T, Division Training, 1959; Fact Sheet, Department of the Army Revised Plans for Reorganization of the United States Army Reserve; see notes, Historical Data Cards for the 70th, 76th, 78th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 89th, 91st, 95th, 98th, 100th, 104th, and 108th Divs (Training), DAMH-HSO.
- ↑ Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1959, pp. 169–81.
- ↑ DCSPER, The Troop Program of the Army, Annex 1, Troop Bases Data, Current Actions: Strength, 30 Jun 60, pp. 29–35, ACofS Reserve Components, Reserve Components Control Program of the Army, FY 1960, pp. 53–96, Office, Chief of Army Reserve and Reserve Officer Training Corps, "Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 60–30 Jun 61," p. 14, all DAMH-HSR; Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year 1960, p. 33; Donald McGowan, "Army National Guard Today," Army Information Digest 15 (Mar 1960): 17.
