An image should appear at this position in the text.General Eddlemanpentagonal divisions, employed a building-block approach to organization. Rather than establishing permanent infantry and armored divisions, the Germans relied on infantry and armored brigades that would be formed into divisions tailored for specific missions. The German brigades, although fixed organizations, could also control additional battalions. To increase flexibility, elements of armor and mechanized infantry battalions could be interchanged to form combat teams heavy in infantry or armor.[1]
In less than three months Powell submitted a study entitled "Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (1961–1965)," usually called ROAD, to the Army Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker. Unlike the PENTANA and MOMAR-1 studies, ROAD did not address the general reorganization of the Army; it dealt only with infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions. Using the armored division as a model, the study called for all three to have a common base to which commanders could assign varying numbers of "maneuver" (i.e., ground combat) elements—infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank battalions. The predominant maneuver element determined whether the division was classified as infantry, mechanized infantry, or armor.[2]
The base for every ROAD division would consist of a headquarters element, which included the division commander and two assistant division commanders; three brigade headquarters; a military police company; aviation, engineer, and signal battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with an air and three ground troops; division artillery; and a support command. The division artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John rocket battalion, and a composite battalion (one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer batteries). All artillery was self-propelled. The division artillery commander, however, was reduced from a brigadier general to a colonel. The support command embodied a headquarters and headquarters company, an administration company, a band, and medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions. Although structured alike in all divisions, the supply and transport and the maintenance battalions varied in strength and equipment to accommodate the missions of the divisions, The commander of the support command assumed responsibility for all divisional supply, maintenance, and medical services and the rear area activities, including security. Supply and maintenance
- ↑ Interview, author with Eddleman, 18 Sep 74, DAMH-HSO; J, Perret-Gential, "Divisions—Three or Five Elements?" Military Review 41 (Feb 1961); 16–25.
- ↑ Ltr, CG, CONARC, to CofS, 1 Mar 61, sub: Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 1961–1965, ATCG 322 (Div), Division General file, DAMH-HSO; Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 1965 (hereafter cited as ROAD 65) (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Continental Army Command, 1960). Some speculate that the ROAD concept was worked out at the Army War College before Eddleman instructed the command to undertake the study. (See Memo, Donmis to Starry, sub: Historical Background on Three Versus Four Companies.)
