borne brigade, Like divisions, the brigade had no fixed structure but consisted of a base, which could command and control from two to five maneuver battalions. The brigade base consisted of a headquarters company; a reconnaissance troop; light tank and engineer companies; a 105-mm. howitzer battalion; and a support battalion (Chart 38). Within the latter organization were administrative, medical, supply, transport, and maintenance resources that allowed the brigade to conduct independent operations. The brigade, however, had limitations, including inadequate air defense artillery and airlift resources, Its mobility on land was restricted by its limited number of organic vehicles. Nevertheless, the brigade met most of the Army's requirements for a small airborne combat team. At the Army Staff's direction, the idea was extended to armor, infantry, and mechanized infantry brigades. Since such units could operate independently or reinforce divisions, they promised to greatly increase the overall flexibility of the field army.[1]
Powell suggested to Eddlemen during the early development of ROAD that if it were approved the Army should have a comprehensive information plan explaining the rationale for such a major reorganization. Both the military and the general public had to be reminded that organizations evolved in response to past experience and new equipment. Furthermore, political implications had to be considered. General Taylor, the primary advocate of pentomic divisions, then serving on the White House staff, might question the radical shift. Also, the reserve community might object to the turbulence so soon after completing the pentomic reorganization.[2]
Powell's desire for a publicity plan received a boost when the new Kennedy administration, reacting to the worldwide struggle with communism, decided to improve the readiness of the nation’s military forces. On 25 May 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced to a joint session of Congress that the Army's divisional forces would be modernized to increase conventional firepower, improve tactical mobility in any environment, and ensure flexibility. In addition, separate brigades would be organized to help meet direct or indirect threats throughout the world.[3]
ROAD Delayed
Kennedy's statement implied an immediate reorganization, but international events delayed changes. During the summer of 1961 relations between the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, particularly over the status of Berlin, and on 25 July the president asked Congress for funds to fill existing pentomic divisions and modernize their equipment. He also sought authority to order the reserves to a year of active duty. Congress agreed, and the Army postponed the ROAD reorganization.[4]
To answer Soviet initiatives in Berlin, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed that the five divisions in Europe be brought to full table of organization strength and that the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions each be
- ↑ Ltr, CONARC to DCofS for Military Operations, 31 May 61, sub: ROAD-65 Type Brigade (Separate, Airborne), ATSND-P 322 (Div), and Ltr, CONARC to Commandant, U.S. Armor School, 28 Sep 61, sub: Separate Brigade Organizations Under ROAD, ATTNG-D&R (Div), both Brigade General file, DAMH-HSO.
- ↑ Ltr, Powell to Eddleman, 23 Feb 61, Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
- ↑ Kennedy, Papers of the Presidents, 1961, p. 401.
- ↑ Ibid., pp. 533–36; DA Bull 5, 1961,
