The following year, to increase further flexibility in the reserves, the National Guard's 53d and 86th Infantry Brigades were converted to armored brigades, and the 67th Infantry Brigade was reorganized as mechanized infantry, The 53d and 67th retained their five maneuver elements, but the 86th lost one battalion. The 1964 reorganization also provided the 258th Infantry Brigade in Arizona with an armor battalion from Missouri and a field artillery battalion from far-away Virginia.[1]
Airmobility
The ROAD reorganization sought flexible forces to meet worldwide commitments on various battlefields, but by April 1962 McNamara had become concerned about unit mobility, He believed that firepower had been favored over maneuverability and that more aircraft could achieve a better balance. The Army's earlier explorations had focused primarily on the number of aircraft, airplanes and helicopters, needed for observation and transportation, but some championed a tactical role for the latter, McNamara wanted the Army to take a new look at the employment of aircraft in land warfare, particularly the helicopter.[2]
In the spring of 1962 the Continental Army Command appointed the Mobility Requirements Board, often referred to as the Howze Board after its president, Lt. Gen, Hamilton H. Howze, to study the matter. After three months of frantic work, including field exercises, the board came to the general conclusion that the adoption of airmobility, the capability of a unit to deploy and receive support from aircraft under the control of a ground commander, was necessary and desirable. In some ways, the transition seemed as inevitable as that from animal to motor transport.[3]
The Howze Board recommended sweeping changes in the use of aircraft, including the organization of air assault divisions, Although combat support elements were not identified, these divisions were to resemble ROAD organizations (Chart 39) and were to have sufficient aircraft to lift one-third of the divisional combat elements at one time. The division had some fixed-wing aircraft, but most were to be in an air transport brigade, a nondivisional unit, which was to reinforce the transport capabilities of the division. To keep the division as light as possible, the board suggested the use of new, lighter 105-mm. howitzers, Little John rockets, and air-to-ground rockets mounted on helicopters as replacements for the 155-mm. howitzers. In addition, infantry was to be relieved of all burdens except for those associated with combat. The board’s estimates for divisional aircraft ranged between 400 and 600, but ground vehicle requirements fell from 3,400 to 1,100. Air assault divisions were to replace airborne divisions, and the board recommended assigning airborne-qualified personnel to the new units. Air cavalry combat brigades (ACCB) were endorsed for classic cavalry missions—screening, reconnoitering, and delaying actions. Such brigades were to be strictly air units, and they were to employ attack helicopters in antitank roles. The board also rec-
- ↑ Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1965, p. 29; Reserve Component Program of the Army, FY 1965, Annex II, Army National Guard Unit Program, pp. 144–53.
- ↑ Barbara A. Sorrill and Constance J. Suwalsky, The Origins, Deliberations, and Recommendations of the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board) (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S, Army Combat Developments Command, 1969), pp, 10–11.
- ↑ U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (Howze Board), Final Report, 20 Aug 62, p. 95, DAMH-HSR; Hamilton H. Howze, Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General: A Cavalryman's Story (Washington, D.C.; Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), pp. 233–57.
