An image should appear at this position in the text.General Weyandbifunctional staffs (the unit commander serving as a chief of staff with two deputies, one for operations and military intelligence and the other for personnel and logistics); rearmament, refueling, and maintenance in the forward area of the battlefield; and consolidation of administration at the battalion level also came under serutiny.3
In March 1975 Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand suggested to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles that the structure of divisions should be reexamined, Weyand was concerned that new technology had resulted in only "add ons" to divisions, increasing their weight and complexity and decreasing their overall flexibility. Cowles turned to General William E. DePuy, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), established in 1973 specifically to address training and doctrine issues, for his views. DePuy assembled a group of officers from his command and the Army's schools and centers to conduct a division restructuring analysis focused on finding the optimum antiarmor capability for divisions, Among the areas considered were the employment of the new armored vehicles coming into service and the problems associated with exploiting new artillery and target acquisition systems whose range had been greatly increased.4
The major product of the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) was the "heavy division" (Chart 44), an organization designed to replace both mechanized infantry and armored divisions. Headed by Col. (later General) John Foss, from the Training and Doctrine Command, the planning group believed that the principles underlying the new organization could be applied to all divisions.
The heavy division included three brigades, each consisting of a permanent combat team of two mechanized infantry and three tank battalions. Infantry battalions consisted of one combat support, one TOW, and three small rifle companies; tank battalions, similar in structure to the mechanized infantry units, fielded three tank companies and maintenance, TOW, and combat support companies. A tank company had three tank platoons with each platoon having only three tanks. The precise location of the TOW antitank missile launchers posed the old problem of centralized versus decentralized control for the planners, much as had the introduetion of other new weapons and equipment, such as the machine gun, tank, antitank gun, airplane, and helicopter. For now they remained under control of the battalion.5
