small medical, signal, and cavalry units, along with a provisional quartermaster (bakers and cooks) unit. The Galveston and San Diego brigades were intended to defend against possible attack by the Mexican Navy, while the Maneuver Division readied for offensive operations against Mexico.[1]
The Army experienced great difficulty with this assembly of troops. Scores of movement orders had to be issued, and inadequate arrangements for transportation caused innumerable delays. Upon arriving at their new stations, the units found themselves considerably under strength. The division initially had about 8,000 officers and enlisted men but, with the addition of recruits, its strength climbed to 12,809. That total represented only about two-thirds of the authorized strength outlined in the regulations for the division. Although the division impressed some American citizens, General Wood's comment was "How little.."[2]
During the concentration of troops along the border, which lasted for almost five months, the Army learned many lessons about readiness. The foremost one concerned the effects of the lack of a mobilization plan, which caused delays in notifying and transporting units. Sixteen days were required to assemble the small force. By comparison, the following year the Bulgarians needed only eighteen days to mobilize 270,000 men against the Turks. After the troops arrived at the mobilization sites, the division's inspector general found many problems. No two units had the same tentage, transportation equipment, or quartermaster supplies. The large numbers of recruits overwhelmed the units and caused general confusion. Medical units performed poorly since they had been haphazardly organized.[3]
To correct these faults, the inspector general recommended that standard field equipment be issued to all units, that their peacetime strength be increased, and that permanent field hospitals and ambulance companies be maintained. Logistical problems stemmed from the lack of regulatory civilians in the ammunition and supply trains. But rather than urging the organization of those units, the inspector suggested that the Army experiment with "autotrucks."[4]
In the communications arena, the Signal Corps tested the telegraph, wireless telegraph (radio), and the airplane during tactical exercises. Cavalry employed the wireless telegraph, while infantry used telegraph wire, and both reported great success. In addition to training officers to fly, the airplane was used for reconnaissance in the division, which spurred further aeronautical development.[5]
When the Maneuver Division and the brigades were mobilized, General Wood expected that they could remain on the border for three months without asking Congress for additional money. He succeeded. The brigades at Galveston and San Diego were discontinued in June 1911, and divisional elements began returning to their home stations at the end of July. On 7 August the division headquarters passed into history.[6]
The mobilization served many purposes, not the least of which was to give impetus to General Wood's preparedness campaign. The performance of the division and the brigades illustrated the nation's unpreparedness for war.
- ↑ Rpt of the Sec. of War, Rpt of TAG, Rpt of th QMG, ARWD, 1911, pp. 12–16, 238–41, 337; Memo for record, 7 Mar 11, no subject, Wood Papers, LC.
- ↑ Rpt of the Chief of Staff and Rpt of TAG, ARWD, 1911, pp. 156–57, 238–42. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 334. The quote is from ltr, Gen Wood to Col James G. Harbord, 26 Apr 1911, Wood Papers, LC.
- ↑ Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 148–49; WCD, "Statement for release in morning papers on Monday, February 3," Wood Papers, LC.
- ↑ Rpt of the Inspector General, ARWD, 1911, pp. 267–69.
- ↑ Rpt of the Chief Signal Officer, ARWD, 1911, pp. 721, 739.
- ↑ Ltr, William Howard Taft to Gen Leonard Wood, 12 Mar 1912, no subject, Wood Papers, LC: Rpt of TAG, ARWD, 1911, p. 242.
