Heavy losses during the greatest American involvement in World War I, the Meuse-Argonne campaign that began on 26 September 1918, created a need for additional replacements. One week of combat left divisions so depleted that Pershing ordered personnel from the 84th and 86th Divisions, which had just arrived in France, to be used as replacements.[1] The arrangement was supposed to be temporary, and at first only men from infantry and machine gun units served as replacements. Eventually all divisional personnel were swallowed up, except for one enlisted man per company and one officer per regiment who maintained unit records. The manpower shortage persisted. On 17 October the 31st Division, programmed as the depot division, was skeletonized and its men used as replacements. The 34th and 38th Divisions were also stripped of their men as they arrived from the United States. Nevertheless, the high casualty rate took a toll on all combat units, and Pershing slashed the authorized strength of infantry and machine gun companies from 250 to 175 enlisted men, thereby temporarily reducing each division by 4,000 men. Smaller combat divisions, however, conducted some of the fiercest fighting of the war-attacks against the enemy's fortified positions on the hills between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River.[2]
While scrambling for personnel, Pershing again reorganized the replacement system, trying to improve its responsiveness to the flexible army corps and army organizations. Army corps replacement battalions failed because divisions left the corps so rapidly that the battalions were unable to keep up with them. Therefore, he ordered the 40th and 85th Divisions to serve as regional replacement depots for the First and Second Armies, respectively, and the 41st and 83d as depot divisions in the Services of Supply. The other two depot divisions, the 39th and 76th, were stripped of their personnel. The replacement system, however, remained unsatisfactory to the end of the war.[3]
Divisions in France also suffered from a shortage of animals for transport. As the quartermaster general had predicted in 1917, units never had more than half the transportation authorized in their tables of organization for lack of animals. In some divisions artillerymen moved their pieces by hand. To overcome the shortage, Pershing's staff planned to motorize the 155-mm. howitzer regiments and one regiment of 75-mm. guns in each division. By November 1918, however, only eleven 155-mm. howitzer regiments had been thus equipped.[4]
Troop shortages also hit support units. During the fall of 1918 the commander of the Services of Supply, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, requested personnel from three combat divisions for labor units in his command. On 17 September Pershing's headquarters reassigned three divisions scheduled to arrive from the United States to Harbord. Only one of these, the 87th, reported before the end of the fighting, and it was broken up for laborers in the Services of Supply.[5]
Handicapped by the scarcity of men and animals, Pershing sought ways to make divisions more effective combat units. In October 1918 he advised new division commanders to use their personalities to increase the patriotism, morale,
- ↑ In addition to combat losses, the fall of 1918 witnessed one of the most severe influenza epidemics in history, which spread to over 25 percent of the Army in France (see Coffman, The War To End All Wars, pp. 81–84). 60 "Final Report" and "Report of Assistant Cold, G–1, G.H.Q., A.E.F., printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 55, 147–52; Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 401. 61 "Report of Assistant CofS, G–1, G.H.Q., A.E.F.," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 147–52. 62 "Final Report of Assistant Chief of Staff (G–4)," and "Final Report of the Chief of Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 77, 205–06;
- ↑ "Final Report" and "Report of Assistant Cold, G–1, G.H.Q., A.E.F., printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 55, 147–52; Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 401. 61 "Report of Assistant CofS, G–1, G.H.Q., A.E.F.," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 147–52. 62 "Final Report of Assistant Chief of Staff (G–4)," and "Final Report of the Chief of Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 77, 205–06;
- ↑ "Report of Assistant CofS, G–1, G.H.Q., A.E.F.," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 147–52.
- ↑ "Final Report of Assistant Chief of Staff (G–4)," and "Final Report of the Chief of Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 77, 205–06; McKenney, "Field Artillery," p. 188.
- ↑ John Hagood, The Services of Supply, A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), pp. 317–20; Divisions, p. 389.
