the states or passing the barrier which divides them. Every word in the constitution shows that that jurisdiction is so limited. There is no expression therein which can reach the jurisdiction of the state courts. The court repeats the idea that nothing contained in the constitution would justify the “withdrawal” of a judgment of a state court from the power of the federal appellate court. I retort the argument upon them by saying that what has never been granted need not to be “withdrawn.”
The supreme court seems to have triumphed over one of the defendant's counsel who had said that the construction contended for would operate a complete consolidation of the states, so far as respects the judicial power. They have conceded in effect, however, that a partial consolidation must ensue. A consolidation must be the inevitable result, to the extent of, and quoad the right of reversal, actually claimed. That partial consolidation will soon become total by destroying the checks in favor of the rights of the states deposited with the state judiciaries.
The court winds up its opinion on this part of the subject by saying that the words which import the power in question should not be “restricted” by a “forced construction,” and that those words justify that power. The words need, not be “restricted” to import a contrary construction. The words of the judicial article, taken singly, only relate to the judicial power of the United States, and to the supreme and inferior courts thereof. Not an iota of them applies to the state courts. But these words must not be taken singly. There are, also, other words in the constitution which must not be forgotten; words which deny to the general government and reserve to the states all powers not “delegated” to the former, by the constitution.
