they are to be considered as if the man or men were different; and if the right of legislating for the district had been confided to three men by name, and their successors, the ambiguity which is supposed to exist in this case, would not have appeared. It is not indeed, expressly said that this function is involved on the congress, in auter droit: nor was it necessary. This will be inferred from the nature of the grant itself. The terms, ‘exclusive legislation,” used in the constitution on this subject, show that their legislation in this particular, is to be confined to the limits of the district. That is not a mere exclusive legislation over the district which soars as high as does the pretension now in question. The claim now set up is that of exclusive legislation also, in and over the territory of all the states! The congress would, in this case then go beyond its charter as the local legislature for the district. That charter does not authorize them to overrule the, at least, concurrent powers of the several states within their own territories. Far less can they devolve this great power upon the corporation of the city of Washington. I would here remark that if the act in question has not an operation, as the court has decided, beyond the limits of the district for want of adequate words to that effect, neither can the constitution have such operation, for want of similar words, in the clause in question. There is not only an omission of positive words, to convey this power, to the extent to which it is now claimed, but there are restrictive words to confine the operation of its laws, to the limits of the territory.
If we advert to that history, in relation to this district, to which the court is so fond of referring, we shall find that it gives no manner of countenance to its construction in the present instance. The territory in question, and the powers
