arise from his opening the negotiation directly, if we can bring about a readiness to come to terms on both sides, they may more easily arrange the details for themselves than we can for them.'
After Captain Burnes had left Kábul in April, 1838, and was on his way to India, on May 22 the Governor-General finally caused him to be addressed in these terms: —
'You dwell on the long silence as to the feelings of Ranjít Singh regarding Pesháwar. But you will remember that it was distinctly stated in instructions of the 20th of January and 7th of March that Dost Muhammad must first disclaim all intention of making a sine qua non of the restoration (or more properly the cession) to him, wholly or partially, of Peshawar, before we could enter at all seriously on the subject with Ranjít Singh. That disclaimer, it is needless to say, he has never made; and in the end he has insisted on pretensions in a spirit directly the reverse, so that for the result he has only to accuse himself.'
From the position which Dost Munammad had taken up Captain Burnes was totally unable to drive him. He saw that the Amír was a man of paramount influence in Afghánistán, whose alliance could be of the greatest value to us. But in order that we should make him our friend it was necessary that we should make Ranjít Singh our enemy. That, in Lord Auckland's judgment, would be madness. The promises lavished by the Russian agent at Kábul, combined with daily expectation of the fall of Herát, and of the discomfiture of British policy, had rendered Dost Muhammad impracticable.
