without British partnership. His views, says the Chief Secretary, have the concurrence of Wade and Mackeson, the two officers to whose judgment is due the greatest deference from their peculiar knowledge of the Mahárájá's character. There is no safe middle course. Either the Government of India must act strictly on the defensive, trusting to its own power to repel invasion, and to a fortuitous concurrence of events to frustrate the intrigues of Russia and Persia on its western frontier; or it must take arms against this sea of troubles, and, by opposing, end them. It was not practicable that Sháh Shujá could be restored to the throne of Kábul by Sikh bayonets. Were he so restored, the last state of Kábul would be worse than the first. Day by day the Chief Secretary repeats these arguments, pressing for leave to tell Ranjít Singh that, 'with or without the co-operation of the Mahárájá, the Government of India will set up Sháh Shujá.' Lord Auckland was not to be hurried. If Wade and Mackeson were right in their estimate of Ranjít Singh, he replied, co-operation with him was not to be hoped for. On the other hand, though it might be well, by opposing troubles, to end them, it might be as well too, to consider whether we are not flying to others that we know not of. 'Our ignorance of what is passing in the Persian camp, the obscure responsibility of the Government here in regard to Persia and to European politics, and the measure which I take of hazards to be incurred, would lead me much rather to stand still, as nearly as circumstances
