Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/260

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252
CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.

§ 1380. These general considerations naturally conduct us to some more difficult inquiries growing out of them; and upon which there has been a very great diversity of judicial opinion. The great object of the framers of the constitution undoubtedly was, to secure the inviolability of contracts. This principle was to be protected in whatever form it might be assailed. No enumeration was attempted to be made of the modes, by which contracts might be impaired. It would have been unwise to have made such an enumeration, since it might have been defective; and the intention was to prohibit every mode or device for such purpose. The prohibition was universal.[1]

§ 1381. The question has arisen, and has been most elaborately discussed, how far the states may constitutionally pass an insolvent law, which shall discharge the obligation of contracts. It is not doubted, that the states may pass insolvent laws, which shall discharge the person, or operate in the nature of a cessio bonorum, provided such laws do not discharge, or intermeddle with the obligation of contracts. Nor is it denied, that insolvent laws, which discharge the obligation of contracts, made antecedently to their passage, are unconstitutional.[2] But the question is, how far the states may constitutionally pass insolvent laws, which shall operate upon, and discharge contracts, which are made subsequently to their passage. After the most ample argument it has at length been settled by a majority of the Supreme Court, that the states may constitutionally pass such laws operating upon future contracts.


  1. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. R. 199, 200.
  2. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. R. 122; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. R. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R. 213.