CHAPTER I.
Critical Presentation of Theoretical Views on the Psychology of Dementia Præcox.
The interpretation of the psychological disturbances of dementia præcox are found in literature only in the form of fragmentary attempts which although they at times go quite far, yet nowhere have they any clear coordination. The statements of the older authors have only a limited value as they refer now to this now to that form of mental disease which can only be indefinitely classified as dementia præcox. Hence one must not attribute to them any general validity. The first general view concerning the nature of the psychological disturbance in catatonia was that of Tschisch,[1] who, in 1886, thought that it was essentially due to inability of attention. A similar but somewhat differently conceived view was given by Freusberg.[2] He stated that the automatic actions of the catatonic are associated with a condition of reduction of consciousness which causes a loss of control over his psychical processes. The motor disturbances are only symptomatic expressions for the degree of psychic tension.
According to Freusberg the motor catatonic symptoms are dependent upon corresponding psychological manifestations. The "weakening of consciousness" points to the quite modern view of Pierre Janet. Also Kraepelin,[3] Aschaffenburg,[4] Ziehen and others affirm that there is a disturbance of attention. In 1894 we meet for the first time with an experimental psychological work on the subject of catatonia. It is the investigation of Sommer, "On the Study of 'Inhibition' of Mental Processes."[5]
The author makes the following statements which are of gen-
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