Page:Jung - The psychology of dementia praecox.djvu/75

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INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONAL COMPLEX ON ASSOCIATION.
51

experiment, if his attention decreases, that is, if without any external reason the attention is turned away from the meaning of the stimulus word there must be an internal cause for this distractibility. We find this mostly in the antecedent or in the same reaction. There appears a strongly emotional idea, a complex, which on account of its strong feeling tone, assumes great distinction in consciousness, or when repressed sends an inhibition into consciousness, and in this way either suspends for a short time the effect of the directing idea (attention to the stimulus word) or simply diminishes it. The correctness of this supposition can usually be proven without any difficulty by analysis.[1] The phenomenon described is therefore of practical value as a complex-indicator. Of theoretical value is the fact that the complex need not be conscious for the subject. From the repression it can send an inhibition into consciousness, thus disturbing the attention; in other words, it can check the intellectual functioning of consciousness (prolongation of reaction time), or can make it impossible (errors), or can diminish its value (sound associations). The association experiments merely show us the details, whereas clinical and psychological observation show us the same phenomena in gross outlines. A strong complex, such as a tormenting grief, hinders concentration; we are unable to tear ourselves away from the grief and direct our activity and interests into other channels. When we make an attempt to do this, "to drown our sorrow," we succeed perhaps for a short time, but we are able to do it only "half-heartedly." Without our knowing it at the time, the complex prevents us from giving ourselves up entirely to our tasks. We undergo all possible inhibitions, during pauses of thought (deprivation of thought in dementia præcox) there appear fragments of complexes, which just as in association experiments, produce characteristic disturbances in intellectual functioning. We make mistakes in writing according to the rules of Meringer and Mayer,[2] we produce condensations, perseverations, anticipations, etc., and especially Freud's errors, which last reveal by their content the determining complex.

  1. For the technic of the analysis see Diagnost. Assoz.-Stud., VI and VIII Beitrag, and Jung: Die psychologische Diagnose des Tatbestandes. Jurist.-psych. Grenzfragen, 1906.
  2. Versprechen und Verlesen etc., Stuttgart, 1895.