to the commission to be established between England and France are, in the words of the writer of the "Observations," "exactly the kind of tariff that all nations at all times would have had, if their commercial legislation had been founded on the established principles of political economy."
Undoubtedly "every change in the public economy of a great nation, ought to be cautiously and gradually effected," and "with the smallest amount of inconvenience and loss to the individuals who have vested their capital on the faith of legislative protection." Without mooting the point whether vested rights can accrue under a nudum pactum; or urging the argument that the manufacturers were parties to, if not sole actors in, that legislation, and can take no advantage of their own wrong; or dwelling on the consideration that, if they do suffer, the intermediate cause being low prices, the public at large will be the gainers, let it be admitted that the duties must be gradually reduced, and then the inquiry arises how is this to be effected? The answer is furnished by the paper under review.
"In order that no capitalist who is now engaged in manufactures may be injured by the change, it should be provided that the duties should continue as they now are for three years, and be reduced one third in each of the three following years. Such an arrangement would afford ample time for every one, who is at all interested in any existing enterprise, to prepare for the altered state of circumstances, and to avoid loss."
One of the greatest abuses prevalent in this country is, the misapplication of public money. Our legislators, whether federal, state, or municipal, seem to forget that the funds at their disposal are raised by taxation, and that taxes are no blessing; nor do they even pause to inquire for what purposes the taxes were paid by the people. Their situation is exactly that of a private agent. They are the trustees of the people, and have their power of attorney, and letter of instructions—and yet, were an individual to misapply money entrusted to him for specified objects, half so grossly as do the public servants, he would be broken by his employer, and branded by the community for dishonesty and faithlessness. It is in vain to rely upon written directions, or the merit of public agents without responsibility constantly enforced by the vigilance of the principal. That vigilance can only be kept up in the people by making them feel the taxes, and understand distinctly for what uses they are enacted. By direct taxation this may
