Second, Plaintiffs’ delay prejudices Defendants. See Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1980) (“As time passes, the state’s interest in proceeding with the election increases in importance as resources are committed and irrevocable decisions are made, and the candidate’s claim to be a serious candidate who has received a serious injury becomes less credible by his having slept on his rights.”) This is especially so considering that Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are not merely last-minute—they are after the fact. While Plaintiffs delayed, the ballots were cast; the votes were counted; and the results were certified. The rationale for interposing the doctrine of laches is now at its peak. See McDonald v. Cnty. of San Diego, 124 F. App’x 588 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)); Soules, 849 F.2d at 1180 (quoting Hendon v. N.C. State Bd. Of Elections, 710 F.2d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1983)) (applying doctrine of laches in post-election lawsuit because doing otherwise would, “permit, if not encourage, parties who could raise a claim to lay by and gamble upon receiving a favorable decision of the electorate and then, upon losing, seek to undo the ballot results in a court action”).
Plaintiffs could have lodged their constitutional challenges much sooner than they did, and certainly not three weeks after Election Day and one week after certification of almost three million votes. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ delay results in their claims being barred by laches.
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