But where, as here, the only injury Plaintiffs have alleged is that the Elections Clause has not been followed, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[the] injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that [courts] have refused to countenance.”[1] Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007). Because Plaintiffs “assert no particularized stake in the litigation,” Plaintiffs fail to establish injury-in-fact and thus standing to bring their Elections Clause and Electors Clause claims. Id.; see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 356 F. App’x 781, 784 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lance, 549 U.S. at 441-42) (affirming district court’s conclusion that citizens did not allege injury-in-fact to support standing for claim that the state of Tennessee violated constitutional law).
- ↑ Although separate constitutional provisions, the Electors Clause and Elections Clause share “considerable similarity,” Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 839, (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and Plaintiffs do not at all distinguish the two clauses in their motion for injunctive relief or reply brief (ECF No. 7; ECF No. 49 at Pg ID 3076-78). See also Bognet v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., No. 20-3214, 2020 WL 6686120, at *7 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2020) (applying same test for standing under both Elections Clause and Electors Clause); Wood, 2020 WL 6817513, at *1 (same); Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (characterizing Electors Clause as Elections Clauses’ “counterpart for the Executive Branch”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804-05 (1995) (noting that state’s “duty” under Elections Clause “parallels the duty” described by Electors Clause).
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