assurances of peaceful reintegration with can be reviewed after some interval in order to avoid the difficulties which I have described.
If we can, this would mean that we would have accepted Peking as the legal government of China. We would have withdrawn our recognition from Taiwan, we would have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We would have withdrawn our troops from Taiwan. All that would remain is that we would have some relation to peaceful reintegration.
Speaking here frankly and realistically, the political and psychological effect of breaking relations is that our defense relationship will be eroded by the act of recognition. But we need a transition period for our public opinion in which this process can be accomplished without an excessive domestic strain.
These are our basic considerations. If we agree on the principles, we can then see what formula can then be worked out.
Vice Premier Teng: Is that all?
Secretary Kissinger: This is the essence, yes.
Let me emphasize one point. To us the question of the defense commitment is primarily a question of the way it can be presented politically. It is not a question of maintaining it for an indefinite period of time.
Vice Premier Teng: Well, actually this law was formulated by yourselves. Is that so?
Secretary Kissinger: Which law?
Vice Premier Teng: You are the ones who make the law. That is, the law of that defense commitment you have with Taiwan. That was fixed by yourselves.
Secretary Kissinger: Of course. That is absolutely true.
Vice Premier Teng: Well, since you can formulate a law, naturally you can also do away with it.
Secretary Kissinger: That is also true. Our point is not that it could not be done. Our point is that for reasons I have explained
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