Vice Premier Teng: In the Middle East, the basic contradiction is Israel and the whole Arab world and Palestine. That is the basic contradiction in that area. And it is known to all that you are giving Israel an enormous amount of military aid as well as economic aid. As for the Arab world, since you are giving Israel so much aid, in order to resist Israel the Arab people will look to other people for aid, because if you don't give them some aid, others will. They aren't able to make what they need. And the Soviet Union will say, "We have things for you." And by giving them what they need, the Soviet Union gains politically, and by selling arms to the Arab world they gain economic benefits. And you get yourself bogged down in the Middle East.
Secretary Kissinger: But the Soviet Union faces the contradiction that they can give military aid but they can't promote political progress. And in country after country, once they give arms, they get into difficulty. We are studying the question of giving arms to selected Arab countries now.
Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I have a question. Is it possible to encourage the European countries to give some arms to the Arabs?
Secretary Kissinger: Let's have a discussion of this tomorrow in a small meeting. We are aware of the problem, and we share your analysis. If you look at the Arab countries concretely -- in Egypt I think it will be apparent in the next three months that there is no significant change. In Syria, it is my judgment Syria would be prepared to move away from the Soviet Union if Israel were prepared to make any concessions at all in the negotiation.
Vice Premier Teng: They key point is whether you are using only one of your hands or both.
Secretary Kissinger: We are using both our hands, but in a way to minimize our domestic problem. And in Iraq, it is our impression -- as you may have noticed, there is some pressure in Iraq from Iran, and this has led to certain strains between the Soviet Union and Iraq. So much will depend on...
First of all, we agree with your basic principle, that we must have an even-handed policy. And I have to confess that because of the Presidential transition in the summer, we lost two months, two to three months. In June, July, and August we could not begin to operate as effectively as we might. After the Syrian disengagement we had to pause
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
