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Page:Kissinger's Trip (4) - November 25-29, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1553937).pdf/45

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I said that we would appreciate any new information that they might have as well as the return of any remains; our Liaison Office would be giving them specific information on a few cases. They said they had no new information and would let us know if anything developed. This will be helpful with the concerned families. I also asked the Chinese to nudge Hanoi on our MIA's in Vietnam, but I seriously doubt that they will do anything.

"-- I then warned of serious consequences if North Vietnam were to launch a major offensive, citing their violations and recent preparations. I noted that Thieu had made an offer to negotiate on all the political aspects of the Paris peace agreements. Teng stonewalled us on this issue, saying that both the South Vietnamese and we were violating the Paris peace agreement and that we were still bogged down in Vietnam with our military assistance. I do not believe they want Hanoi to heat things up, however.

"-- On bilateral matters which had been discussed in separate counterpart talks, I said that we would try and find a new legal formula to solve the last significant issue in the claims/assets problem which is complicating our trade with the PRC. I noted the symbolic importance of our bilateral exchange program and suggested that there be more balance as well as variety. I also gave a boost to Congressional visits. I said that we favored the visit of Senator Mansfield to the PRC which would begin on December 7 for three weeks, but he was not a spokesman of U. S. foreign policy. I was thinking particularly of Cambodia, where Mansfield has a special interest and relationship with Sihanouk. Teng assured me that the Chinese distinguished between the individual views of Congressmen and official U. S. policy.

"-- On normalization, I stressed the importance of some statement about a peaceful settlement on the Taiwan issue and said that we would think over the various principles that had been discussed on this trip to see whether further progress could be made. I indicated that we would continue the gradual reduction of our presence on Taiwan in any event.

"Tseng professed Chinese lack of interest in a gradual process and said that they would prefer a brisk solution. However, if the U. S. were not ready to meet Chinese principles, Peking could wait. They did wish to solve this question, he said, but only in accordance with their principles. There was some further discussion during which we agreed that no further progress could be made during this trip, but that we would think the matter over further.

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