towards the British Minister and the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. In the prosecution of a work, at once discreditable and inspired by very petty prejudices, no single diplomatic device, which could serve their purpose, has been omitted from their policy. The check, which the plans of the Franco-Russian-Korean party received in consequence of British action has only retarded their development for the moment. It does not perceptibly relieve the situation, nor make the office of the Chief Commissioner more comfortable or the path of the British Minister more easy to follow. Indeed, it is quite certain that the opposition of the Russian and French Ministers to British activity will become more vigorous in the future.
The assistance accorded by the British Government to Mr. Gubbins during the recent crisis, has done much to dispel from the minds of the Koreans those illusions which our past indifference had created. It is improbable that quite identical methods will be employed in any future attempt of the Court to oust Mr. McLeavy Brown from his position. If the Court gave way in the face of the British demonstration, the tact and consideration for the interests of both parties, which Mr. Gubbins subsequently displayed, materially contributed to the restoration of the status quo. Upon the other hand, the apathy of the British Government in failing to protect Mr. McLeavy Brown when he was deprived of the Comptrollership of the Finances at the instigation of the Russian Minister, in 1897, was of course conducive to the late disturbances. The two offices are so closely related, and the masterful and aggressive spirit of the Franco-Russian policy is such, that the accession of a Russian or French nominee to the Chief Commissionership of the Customs would
