enough, the position which Russia holds to-day is not nearly as assertive as that which she occupied in 1896, yet there is little doubt that her influence is more commanding, if less conspicuously aggressive. Japan has turned aside upon occasion from the political issues to develop her commercial interests. Russia, again, has pursued unswerving the policy which revealed with the fall of China the fact that Manchuria was within her grasp and that Korea was its entail.
The action of Russia upon the Yalu River at the present time, her action in respect of Won-san in the past, are each animated by this motiv. Russia regards Korea as the completion of her dominions in the Far East, while Japan looks upon the little kingdom as the corollary to that expansion which is essential to the existence of the Island Empire. Russia in Manchuria and Korea, with her shadow projected over China, would mean a sentence of perpetual restriction and shrinkage for Japan. But, similarly, Russia from her position at Vladivostock and Port Arthur must regard the occupation of Korea by Japan as a wedge with its point projected towards the centre of her Manchurian communications. Just as, therefore, the fear of a Russian descent upon Korea has excited Japan, the necessity for such action has brought the crisis in the relations between Japan and Russia so perceptibly nearer. Private agreements and secret overtures have paved the way for the denouement which long since was disclosed. When Russia endeavoured to requisition the harbour of Ma-san-po for the requirements of her Pacific Squadron, an indication was afforded that Russian activity in Korea would be concealed no longer. Ma-san-po has since become an open port, the Government of Japan at once formulating ingenious objections to the
