hesitation in asserting our conviction that the Freedom of Information Act was passed wholly in the public interest and is to be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be achieved.
The language of the act is so clear, so positive, that there is hardly any need for interpretation. The heart of the act, in its application to this case, lies in Section 5: "Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings formal or informal, special or regular, of the governing bodies of all municipalities . . . shall be public meetings." On April 24, 1967, the North Little Rock city council was unquestionably the governing body of a municipality. Its closed session was unquestionably a meeting, formal or informal, special or regular. How, then, can it be said that the closed session was not a violation of the statute?
Counsel for the city base their arguments entirely on the attorney-client privilege. They insist that the statute should not be construed to apply to a meeting between the city council and the city attorney. It is predicted that the city will not be able to prepare its cases for trial without disclosing its strategy and its weaknesses to its adversaries.
We think that, as a practical matter, counsel are unduly apprehensive about the impact of the act upon municipal litigation. The city attorney, with the assistance of the mayor, department heads, and other municipal employees, can certainly prepare a case for trial without discussing his plans in detail with the city council. By analogy, the State of Arkansas is continually engaged in litigation, but there is scant occasion for its Attorney General or its other legal counsel to confer in secret with the members of the General Assembly.
Regardless of such practical considerations, the act itself effectively refutes the appellants' argument. The legislative mandate cannot be misunderstood: "Except as otherwise specifically [our italics] provided by law,
