Opinion of the Court
portance” under the FAA, namely, that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions” is that “[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of consent.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have emphasized that “foundational FAA principle” many times. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684; see also, e. g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002); First Options, 514 U. S., at 943; Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985).
Consent is essential under the FAA because arbitrators wield only the authority they are given. That is, they derive their “powers from the parties’ agreement to forgo the legal process and submit their disputes to private dispute resolution.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 682. Parties may generally shape such agreements to their liking by specifying with whom they will arbitrate, the issues subject to arbitration, the rules by which they will arbitrate, and the arbitrators who will resolve their disputes. Id., at 683–684. Whatever they settle on, the task for courts and arbitrators at bottom remains the same: “to give effect to the intent of the parties.” Id., at 684.
In carrying out that responsibility, it is important to recognize the “fundamental” difference between class arbitration and the individualized form of arbitration envisioned by the FAA. Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); see also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 349, 351; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 686–687. In individual arbitration, “parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of
