Thomas, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–988
LAMPS PLUS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FRANK VARELA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April 24, 2019]
Justice Thomas, concurring.
As our precedents make clear and the Court acknowledges, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements “just as they would ordinary contracts: in accordance with their terms.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 87 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Federal courts must therefore apply “background principles of state contract law” when evaluating arbitration agreements. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 630 (2009); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 492, n. 9 (1987). “In this endeavor, ‘as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.’” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985)). Thus, where an agreement is silent as to class arbitration, a court may not infer from that silence that the parties agreed to arbitrate on a class basis. 559 U. S., at 687.
Here, the arbitration agreement between Varela and Lamps Plus is silent as to class arbitration. If anything, the agreement suggests that the parties contemplated only bilateral arbitration.[1] App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a (waiving
- ↑ Two intermediate California courts have held, based on similar lan-
