unity without differentiation. Because the two are different, One is not what the Other is; if, however, they are related, if they have identity at the same time with their difference, then this identity is itself different from their difference; it is something different from both of these, because otherwise they would not be different.
Both are different, their unity is not themselves; that wherein they are One, is that wherein they are different; they are, however, different, therefore their unity is different from their difference. And this implies that mediation takes place more strictly in a Third as contrasted with the elements of difference, and thus we have a syllogism; we have Two who are different, and a Third which brings them together, in which they are mediated, are identical.
Thus it is not merely indirectly suggested by, but is actually involved in, the very object with which we are dealing, that in so far as we treat of the knowledge of God we are directly concerned with what has the form of a syllogism. The two are different, and there is a unity, in which they are put into One through a Third; that is the syllogism. Therefore we have to consider more closely the nature of the knowledge of God, which is essentially mediated in itself. The knowledge of God presents itself in its more precise shape under the form of the Proofs of the existence of God. Here the knowledge of God is represented as a mediated knowledge.
That only which is One, abstractly One, is unmediated. The Proofs of the existence of God represent the knowledge of God, because it contains mediacy within itself. Religion itself is knowledge of God. The explication or unfolding of this knowledge, which is mediated, is an unfolding of religion itself. But this form of proof undoubtedly goes somewhat on wrong lines when this knowledge is represented as the proof of the existence of God. Criticism has been directed against it, but the one-sided moment of form which characterises this
