externality to which he concedes an independence relatively to himself, peculiar qualitative characteristics and laws; and it presupposes further that these things in their qualitative character are relative in regard to each other, standing in a manifold connection with one another.
This power, which gives the world a free standing in its qualitative character, is exercised by the educated man by means of his knowledge of the qualities of things, that is to say, of things as they are in regard to other things; another element thus makes its influence felt in them, and their weakness at once shows itself. He learns to know them on that weak side, and operates on them by so arming himself that he is able to attack them in their weakness and to compel them to submit to him.
For the accomplishment of this it is necessary that man should be free in himself. Not until he is himself free does he allow the external world, other people, and natural things to exist over against him as free. To the man who is not free, others are not free either.
On the other hand, any direct influence exercised by man, by means of his ideas, of his will, presupposes this mutual unfreedom, since power over external things is indeed attributed to man as representing what is Spiritual, but not as being a power which acts in a free manner, and which just on that account does not bring itself into relation to what is free, and as something which mediates; on the contrary, here the power over nature acts in a direct way. It thus is magic or sorcery.
As regards the external mode in which this idea actually appears, it is found in a form which implies that this magic is what is highest in the self-consciousness of those peoples. But in a subordinate way magic steals up to higher standpoints too, and insinuates itself into higher religions, and thus into the popular conception of witches, although in that form it is recognised as something which is partly impotent, and partly improper and godless.
