This developed reason yields absolute principles and duties, and the man who is conscious of these absolute determinations in his freedom, in his consciousness, who knows they are immanent determinations within him, has then, for the first time within himself, within his conscience, something to hold by and to give him stability. In so far only as man knows God as Spirit, and knows the determinations of Spirit, are these divine determinations essential, absolute determinations of rationality—determinations, in fact, of that which is duty within him, and which, so far as he is concerned, is immanent in him.
Where the Universal is merely this abstract foundation in a general sense, man has no immanent definite inner life within himself. For this reason, all that is external acquires an inward character for him; everything external has a meaning for him, a relation to him, and, in fact, a practical relation. From a general point of view, this external element is the constitution of the State, the fact that he is ruled from without.
No morality in the strict sense, no immanent rationality by means of which man would have worth and dignity within himself and protection against what is external, is bound up with this religion. All which has a relation to him is for him a power, because he possesses no power in his own rationality and moral sense. The result is this indefinable dependence upon all external circumstances, this complete and entirely arbitrary superstition.
Speaking generally, what lies at the foundation of this external dependence is the fact that all that is particular cannot be placed in an inner relation with a Universal, which remains merely abstract. The interests of individuals lie outside of the universal determinations which the Emperor puts into practice. As regards particular interests, what we find is rather the conception of a power which exists on its own account.
