sciously, and existing things, such as sun, stars, sea, rivers, men, animals, &c., appear as independent existences; their inner element only is determined by the power. Power can only show itself in this sphere as in opposition to the laws of nature, and here, accordingly, would be the place of miracles. But among the Hindus there are no miracles, for they have no rational intelligent Nature. Nature has no intelligent co-relation; everything is miraculous, and therefore there are no miracles. These latter cannot exist until the God is determined as Subject, and as Power which has independent Being, and works in the manner characteristic of subjectivity. Where potentially existent Power is represented as subject, it is of no consequence in what form it appears; accordingly it is represented in human beings, in animals, &c. That vital force acts as immediate power cannot in any case be denied, since as power which is implicitly existent it works invisibly without showing itself.
From this power actual power must be distinguished; the latter is subjectivity, and in it two principal characteristics are to be observed.
The first is that the subject is identical with itself, and at the same time posits definite distinct determinations within itself. There is one subject of these distinctions; they are the moments of one subject. The Good is thus the universal self-determination which is so entirely universal that it has the very same undifferentiated extent as Essence; determination is, in fact, not posited as determination. To subjectivity belongs self-determination, and this means that the determinations present themselves as a plurality of determinations; that they have this reality in relation to the Notion, in contrast to the simple self-involved Being of subjectivity. But at first these determinations are still enclosed within subjectivity, are inner determinations.
The second moment is that the subject is exclusive,
