free from particularity, when the latter has not the range of subjectivity itself, is no longer universal Good. It is another thing when the Good is at the same time made determinate, and is exalted into infinite wisdom. Here a plurality of Good is determined, and thus subjectivity occupies a position of superiority, and it appears as its choice to desire one thing or the other; the subject is posited as deciding, and it appears as the determining of ends and of actions.
The God as substantial unity does not appear as acting; he annihilates, begets, is the basis of things, but does not act. Brahma, for example, does not act; independent action is either merely imagined, or else pertains to the changing incarnations. Yet it is only a limited end or purpose which can come in here; the subjectivity is merely the primal subjectivity, of which the content cannot as yet be infinite truth.
It is at this point, too, that the outward form is determined as human, and thus there is a transition of the god from the animal to human form. In free subjectivity the form which directly corresponds with such a conception is the human one alone; it is no longer life only, but free determination in accordance with ends, therefore the human character appears as the form, it may be a particular subjectivity, a hero or an ancient king, &c. Here where the particular ends make their appearance as in the first form of subjectivity, the human form is not of the indefinite kind represented by Ormazd. On the contrary, specialised forms make their appearance, which have special ends, and are characterised by an element of locality. The principal moments coincide with this. That is to say, to speak more precisely, developed definite character must show itself in the subject; the definite ends of action are limited, defined, are not determinateness in its totality. Determinate character must, however, show itself in the subject in its totality too; developed subjectivity must be beheld
