incomprehensible—Nemesis, in short. It brings down what is high and exalted, and thus establishes equality. But this equalising is not to be understood as meaning that when what pushes itself forward or is too high is brought down, what is low is, in its turn, raised up. On the contrary, that which is low is as it was meant to be; it is the finite which has no particular claims, and no kind of infinite value in itself to which it could appeal. It is thus not too low. It has in it power, however, to rise above the common lot and the ordinary limit of finitude, and when it thus acts in opposition to uniformity it is again thrust down by Nemesis.
If we now directly consider the relation of the finite self-consciousness to this necessity, we see that under the pressure of its iron power it is to have only an obedience without inward freedom. But one form of freedom is at least present when we look at the matter from the side of feeling. The Greek who has within him the feeling of the necessity calms his soul with that. It is so; there is nothing to be done against it; with this I must content myself; just in this feeling that I must be content with it, that this even pleases me, we have the freedom which is implied in the fact that it is mine.
This mental attitude implies that man has this simple necessity before him. In that he occupies the standpoint, “It is so,” he has set all that is particular on one side, has made a renunciation of and abstracts from all particular ends and interests. The vexation, the discontent which men feel consists just in this, that they stick to a definite end, and will not give this up; and then if things do not fit in with this end, or, as may happen, go quite contrary to it, they are dissatisfied. There is then no harmony between what is actually present and what men wish to have, because they have the “ought to be” within themselves—“That ought to be.”
Thus discontent, division, are inherently present; but
