end, or aim. The limited ends and the wisdom in them are of a subordinate character.
Here, however, the limitation of the ends is the fundamental characteristic, and this has no higher one above it.
Religion of this sort is consequently in no sense a religion of unity, but rather of multiplicity; it is neither one Power nor one wisdom, one Idea, which constitutes the fundamental determination of the divine nature.
Thus the ends which constitute the content of those forms of existence are definite ends, and these ends are not to be sought for in Nature; but, on the contrary, we find that amongst the many forms of existence, and of the relations between things, those that have reference to man are undoubtedly the really essential ones. What is human is inherently possessed of thought, and man, in pursuing his end, however unimportant it may be in itself, as, for instance, in seeking nourishment, &c., has the right of using up natural things and animal life without further ado and to whatever extent he may choose. Just for this very reason the ends are not to be sought for as if they existed objectively in the gods and in and for themselves. On the contrary, this religion, in so far as it is a definite religion, owes its origin to human ends, to human need or fortunate events and circumstances.
In the religion which went before this one, it was necessity which was the universal, and which floated above the particular.
This cannot be the case at the present stage; for in necessity finite ends disappear as in a higher form, while here, on the contrary, they represent what gives definite character to things and persists. At this stage the universal represents rather the consent to or agreement with particular ends, and, in fact, consent in general; for here the universal must remain undefined, because the ends remain individual ends, and their universality is only of the abstract sort, and is thus Happiness.
This happiness, however, is not to be distinguished
