made by the objects themselves, but is produced by something else, as these things themselves are. The conformity to an end does not produce itself spontaneously; the active working in accordance with an end is outside of the things, and this harmony which implicitly exists and posits itself, is the force which presides over these objects, which destines them to stand to each other in the relation of things whose existence is determined by an end. The world is thus no longer an aggregate of contingent things, but a collection of relations in conformity with an end, which, however, attach themselves to things from without. This relation of ends must have a cause, a cause full of power and wisdom.
This activity in accordance with an end, this cause, is God.
Kant remarks that this proof is the clearest of all, and can be understood by the ordinary man. It is owing to it that Nature first acquires an interest; it gives life to the knowledge of Nature, just as it has its origin in Nature. This is in a general form the Teleological Proof.
Kant’s criticism is accordingly as follows. This proof, he says, is defective above all, because it takes into consideration merely the form of things. Reference to an end applies only to the determination of form. Each thing preserves itself, and is therefore not merely a means for others, but is an end itself. The quality in virtue of which a thing can be a means has reference to its form merely, and not to its matter. The conclusion, therefore, does not carry us further than the fact, that there is a forming cause; but we do not prove by this that matter also has been produced by it. The proof, says Kant, does not therefore adequately express the idea of God as the creator of matter and not merely of form.
Form contains the characteristics which are mutually related; but matter is to be thought of as without form, and consequently as without relation. This proof therefore stops short at a demiurge, a constructor of matter,
