tended signification, this life was also called the world-soul, the λόγος. All that is posited here is simply the fact of life, and it is not implied that the world-soul is distinguished as Spirit from this active life belonging to it. The soul is simply the living element in the organic; it is not something apart from the body, something material, but is rather the life-force which penetrates the body. Plato accordingly called God an immortal ξῶον, that is, an eternally living being. He did not get beyond the category of life. When we grasp the fact of life in its true nature, it is seen to be one principle, one organic life of the universe, one living system. All that is, simply constitutes the organs of the one subject. The planets which revolve round the sun are simply the giant members of this one system. Regarded in this fashion, the universe is not an aggregate of many accidents existing in a relation of indifference, but is a system endowed with life. With this thought we have not, however, yet reached the essential characteristic of Spirit.
We have considered the formal aspect of the relation of ends. The other aspect is that of the content. The question here may take any of the following forms: What are the essential characteristics of the end, or what is the content of the end which is being realised, or how are these ends constituted in respect of what is called wisdom? So far as the content is concerned, the starting-point is the same as that of experience. We start, that is, from immediate Being. The study of ends in the form in which we actually meet with them, has, when pursued from this side, contributed more than anything else to the neglect of the teleological proof, so much so indeed that this latter has come to be regarded with disdain. We are in the habit of speaking of the wise arrangements of Nature. The various and manifold kinds of animals are, as regards the real nature of the life they have, finite. The external means necessary for
