of the South West. Better form an alliance between these German States of the West, which could for the present give no offence to France; but without including her as a predominant partner, as in the case of the Confederation of the Rhine, and thus gradually prepare for the conflict which must come sooner or later, but the later the better.
Both the negative and the positive part of the advice was followed; the Triple Alliance was left to put an end to itself Leibniz did not know that Charles II's Secret Treaty of Dover (1670) with Louis XIV had already destroyed this diplomatic masterpiece; and an alliance of German States was formed at Marienburg, which with excellent intentions proved a dead letter. The invasion of the United Provinces by France, with England on her side, became more imminent than ever, and a European war, in which (as events proved) the Emperor could not remain neutral even if he would, must almost inevitably follow. Was Germany, like Holland, to fall helpless into the victor's hands? Or might the blow, if it could not be met, be diverted?
This calculation, rather than a dream of bringing the kingdom of the Pharaohs within the range of the Western civilisation which owed an ancient debt to that mysterious land, was, it cannot be doubted, the real raison d'être of Leibniz's famous 'Egyptian plan.' Far from being a mere scholar's fancy, this design had in germ long impregnated the political atmosphere of the West, allying itself with the lingering enthusiasms of the Crusades, and with the desire for a condign revanche which the failure of St. Louis had every now and then called forth in the sons of France. Bacon, whose influence upon Leibniz was probably far greater in the matter of political and social projects than it was in philosophy, had, in the dedication to his Holy Warre suggested that the princes of Christendom should unite against the Turk instead of inflicting damage upon one another. This was shortly after the beginning of the Thirty Years War; thirteen
