right under their guns, and still more of being suddenly shelled by their old familiar friend, Fort Carlisle. A few British inferior war-vessels were lying inside the basin, and were quickly overpowered by the unlooked-for onset of the enemy. Thus, by sunrise on the 12th, the way in was completely laid open across the enfeebled fire of Fort Camden; and, with the following high tide, the whole army of about one hundred and ten thousand men effected a landing in good order at the village of Whitegate [ref. Chap. XIII.].
The reasons for selecting as a battle-field the promontory formed by the land diverging generally eastward and north-eastward from Roche’s Point, were various; the principal being, in the first place, that Queenstown and Cork being friendly towns, it was not desired to inflict on them the damage of a fight; in the second place, the position of Roche’s Tower precluded the danger of being outflanked, water enclosing it on three sides. Certainly, this also precluded the possibility of retreat; but there would be no question of retreat in the deadly struggle contemplated; it would be a question simply of victory or surrender. Again, the Allied commanders were well aware that if those on the English side were to resist the temptation of attack, and to fortify themselves somewhere in the interior to await the invaders, the latter might stay and amuse themselves at Roche’s Tower until they were tired, and then advance against an enemy strongly posted and elaborately prepared for their reception. But from reliable information obtained through their Irish friends and aiders, they could count pretty surely upon provoking a pitched battle at once by the mere fact of their landing, and being attacked upon ground of their own choosing.
The only problem, therefore, was how to lay out the position to the best advantage before the enemy could come
