themselves to determine the law, they might do it, but they must be very sure that they determined according to law; for it touched their consciences, and they acted at their peril."—If I understand your first proposition, you meant to affirm, that the jury were not competent judges of the law in the criminal case of a libel; that it did not fall within their jurisdiction; and that with respect to them, the malice or innocence of the defendants intentions would be a question coram non judice.—But the second proposition clears away your own difficulties, and restores the jury to all their judicial capacities[1]. You make the competence of the court to depend upon the legality of the decision. In the first instance you deny the power absolutely; in the second, you admit the power, provided it be legally exercised. Now, my Lord, without pretending to reconcile the distinctions of Westminster-hall with the simple information of common sense, or the integrity of fair argument, I
- ↑ Directly the reverse of the doctrine he constantly maintained in the house of lords and elsewhere, upon the decision of the Middlesex election. He invariably asserted that the decision must be legal, because the court was competent; and never could be prevailed on to enter farther into the question.
