Peculiar circumstances influence the course of every man whose duty it is to discharge high and important delegated trusts. But if he is an honest man he will never yield principle to expediency, in the hope that by some fortunate chance he may be enabled to repair the injury which he has inflicted upon his country by a wish to conciliate his enemies or temporize for the sake of harmony. To surrender a Constitution to tamperers for plans by which they may gain power to subvert principles or the excitement of a populace, actuated by demagogues, I regard as an act of foul treason. And he whose duty it is to preserve the charter of his country's freedom, and yields to such influences, I esteem either a dastard or a traitor. I regret to entertain the impression that every day lessens the veneration which men and politicians have heretofore entertained, or at least professed, for constitutions. Once they were held in veneration second only to Holy Writ; but now they are derided by many openly, and new theories set up in their place. Statesmen can alone appreciate them, and are willing to rely upon them as the only saving principle of self-government. The above doctrine is now openly advocated by many, that Legislatures have the right not only to exercise the powers plainly delegated to them by the Constitution, but that they have likewise the right to exercise all powers not expressly prohibited by the Constitution, thus destroying all the checks and balances of free government, and throwing into the hands of the legislative department all the co-ordinate powers of government. This, to my mind, is more dangerous to liberty than an assumption by either of the other departments of government. For if either of the others should attempt to assume, or actually assume, a power or powers not granted, the people would easily become awakened to a sense of the danger to which their liberties were subject, because they are not regarded so immediately connected with the people as the legislative department, and are in their character more responsible. The members of Congress being more numerous than the other departments, do not individually incur a proportionate degree of responsibility. What a Legislature does is done by many, or rather by no one; but what is done by either of the other remaining departments can be readily ascertained, promulgated, and the transgressor identified.
Assemblies and deliberative bodies have often destroyed liberty; but no individual, while deliberative bodies have remained honest and incorruptible, has ever overthrown the liberties of any people, and I much doubt if it was ever attempted. Catiline, though unsuccessful, no doubt had many friends in the Roman Senate. Cæsar and Pompey both had their adherents, and the corruption and the factions of the Senate of Rome invited Caesar to enslave his country. Cromwell owed his elevation to a corrupt Parliament, and Napoleon was indebted to the oppression and misconduct of the Assembly of France, for his power. I have recently seen a display of the danger, but it has passed by. If ever the United States do, and they must change their form of government, it will be owing to the assumption of powers by the Congress and the frequency of elections, which open so wide a field to demagogues for all their infamous practices.
I regard all republics as exposed to similar catastrophes. We may desire that period to be far removed from our day when such results must take place, and surely every patriot will cherish a hope that such may never be the case. But when we look
