maintenance of the cause of “Free Trade and Seamen's Rights.” Now to make a peace which was not only not dictated at Quebec or Halifax, but looked rather like a generous concession on the part of a victorious enemy; to make peace while disgraceful defeats of the American arms, among them the capture of the seat of government and the burning of the Capitol, were still unavenged, and while, after some brilliant exploits, the American navy was virtually shut up in American harbors by British blockading squadrons; a peace based upon the status ante bellum, without even an allusion to the things that had been fought for, — in one word, a peace, which, whatever its merits and advantages, was certainly not a glorious peace, — this could not but be an almost unendurable thought to the man who, above all things, wanted to be proud of his country.
It is, therefore, not surprising that, during these five weary months of negotiation, Clay should have been constantly tormented by the perhaps half-unconscious desire to secure to his country another chance to retrieve its fortunes and restore its glory on the field of war, and, to that end, to break off negotiations on some point that would rouse and rally the American people. Thus we find that, according to Adams, on October 31, when complaint was made of the delays of the British government in furnishing passports for vessels to carry the despatches of the American commissioners, “Mr. Clay was for making a strong
