tion; that, if the Constitution did not grant that power in so many words, directly, specifically, unmistakably, it was not granted at all. What did he say now?
“The Constitution contained powers delegated and prohibitory, powers expressed and constructive. It vests in Congress all powers necessary to give effect to the enumerated powers. The powers that may be so necessary are deducible by construction. They are not defined in the Constitution. They are in their nature undefinable. With regard to the degree of necessity various rules have been, at different times, laid down; but perhaps, at last, there is no other than a sound and honest judgment, exercised under the control which belongs to the Constitution and the people. It is manifest that this necessity may not be perceived at one time under one state of things, while it is perceived at another time under a different state of things. The Constitution, it is true, never changes; it is always the same; but the force of circumstances and the lights of experience may evolve, to the fallible persons charged with its administration, the fitness and necessity of a particular exercise of constructive power to-day, which they did not see at a former period.”
And how did he apply this constitutional theory to the pending case? In 1811, he said, the bank did not seem to him necessary, because it was supported mainly upon the ground “that it was indispensable to the Treasury operations,” which, in his opinion, could have been sufficiently aided by the state banks then existing. Therefore the re-chartering of the United States Bank would have been,
