of humanity.” He declared himself far from wishing to intimate that “General Jackson cherished any design inimical to the liberties of the people.” He believed the General's “intentions to be pure and patriotic.” But he denounced the hanging of Indian chiefs without trial, “under color of retaliation,” as utterly unjustifiable and disgraceful. He admitted retaliation as justifiable only when “calculated to produce an effect in the war,” but never on the motive of mere vengeance. As to Arbuthnot and Ambrister, whether they were innocent or guilty, he utterly rejected the argument by which Jackson tried to justify their execution, namely, “that it is an established principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a nation, making war against the citizens of any other nation, they being at peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate.” He maintained that, “whatever may be the character of individuals making private war, the principle is totally erroneous when applied to such individuals associated with a power, whether Indian or civilized, capable of maintaining the relations of peace or war.” He showed that Jackson's doctrine would make every foreign subject serving in an American army an outlaw and a pirate; he might have cited La Fayette and Steuben. This was the moral he drew: —
“However guilty these men were, they should not have been condemned or executed without the authority of law. I will not dwell on the effect of these prece-
