ances which had appeared at the opening of the session in Monroe's message to Congress, and which have since become celebrated as the Monroe doctrine. The message had been even a little stronger in language. Referring to the difference existing between the political system of the “allied powers” in Europe, and that of the American republics, it declared that “we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” Further, with regard to schemes supposed to be contemplated by the allied powers, for interfering with the independence of the newly established Spanish American republics, it said that the American people could not view such interposition “in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” Here, then, Clay found himself in thorough accord with the Monroe administration, whose master spirit in all that concerned foreign affairs was John Quincy Adams. Moreover, although his resolution did not touch it, Clay certainly agreed with the other point of the Monroe doctrine, “that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.”
But when he thrust his resolution into the debate on the Greek question, though with no intention of having it discussed immediately, there was
